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Abstract
For three decades after the 1949 revolution, China pursued a strategy of socialist economic development
based on self-reliance and the centrally directed allocation of resources. Today, China is the fastest growing
economy in the world. China began reform in 1978, just after it emerged from a political crisis started by Mao
Zedong’s death in 1976. China’s policymakers began to recognize the impossibility of traditional methods of
economic management and began to overhaul the economic system. After the start of reforms, real growth
accelerated markedly. China’s GDP has been growing at an annual percentage rate of 9.3% since 1980.
(Waters, xiii) This paper will look at China’s reforms and how these reforms have affected China’s growth in its
agricultural, industrial, and trade sectors.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol6/iss1/17
The Park Place Economist / vol. VI
The Winds of Change: Chinas Growing Economy
Tony Johnson & Jennifer Van Dyke
I. INTRODUCTION
For three decades after the 1949 revolution,
China pursued a strategy of socialist economic devel-
opment based on self-reliance and the centrally directed
allocation of resources.  Today, China is the fastest
growing economy in the world.  China began reform
in 1978, just after it emerged from a political crisis
started by Mao Zedongs death in 1976.  Chinas
policymakers began to recognize the impossibility of
traditional methods of economic management and
began to overhaul the economic system.  After the start
of reforms, real growth accelerated markedly.  Chinas
GDP has been growing at an annual percentage rate
of 9.3% since 1980. (Waters, xiii)  This paper will
look at Chinas reforms and how these reforms have
affected Chinas growth in its agricultural, industrial,
and trade sectors.
II. HISTORY OF CHINESE REFORM
A. Four Phases of Reform
China has had many steps to reform.  Chinas
reform can be divided into four phases.  The first phase
was from 1978-1984.  During this time, reform
policies were similar to those adopted in the early
1960s to rehabilitate the economy in the aftermath of
the Great Leap Forward.  The agricultural changes of
this phase included price increases, relaxing of rural
market restrictions, and the decentralization of
farming.  Some industrial changes included the re-
introduction of the bonus system and experimentation
on profit retention by state owned enterprises.  In
foreign economic relations, preferential polices were
conferred on special economic zones with the aim of
attracting foreign investment.  These zones also acted
as laboratories for bolder market-oriented reforms.
The second phase (1984-1988) of reform focused more
on the urban industrial sectors.  Authorities introduced
enterprise taxation, linked compensation with
productivity, and broke up the monobank system.  The
third phase (1988-1991) was a period of frugality.
Reforms had been successful in spurring demand and
production, which caused double-digit inflation by
1988.  Plans for a new round of price reforms were
deferred, and there was some reversal of earlier
reforms.  These measures succeeded in stabilizing
prices, but they also resulted in a sharp slowdown of
the economy.  In late 1990 authorities resorted to
stimulative monetary and investment policies to
reactivate the economy.  The economy began to
recover in 1991.  In the fourth phase (1992-present)
authorities declared an end to the reversal program
and announced their intention to accelerate the process
of reform.  In 1992 the Communist Party formally
embraced Deng Xiaopings view that the market
system was not incompatible with the ideals of
socialism and called for the establishment of a socialist
market economy.  The countrys constitution was
amended to delete references to a planned economy
and to enshrine the new goal of establishing a market
system.  The continuing goal of the Chinese
government is to develop a democratic economic
system within a one-party political system.
B. Agricultural Reform
During the early years of reform, China
focused on changing the agricultural system.  Between
1978 and 1984, as a result of reforms, productivity
and output grew by an annual average of about 8.8%.
These impressive gains can be attributed to both the
introductions of improved individual incentives
instilled in the household responsibility system and to
an increase in acquisition prices.  The growth of total
agriculture production moderated to an average of
about 4% from 1985 to 1991, reflecting a number of
factors.  Some reasons for the slowdown include less
improvement in the relative prices of agricultural
products (especially grain) than in earlier years, low
investment in agriculture related to infrastructure by
farmers (who have tended to invest in housing) and
by collectives (which have preferred to invest in
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs)), and the
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outflow of the labor force from the cropping sector.
Even though growth in agriculture has slowed, reform
has been very positive.  The large productivity and
output gains in the agricultural sector resulted in a
decline in rural poverty from 33% in 1978 to less than
11% in 1984. (Bell, 60)
The opportunities provided by the reforms in
the agricultural sector led to the development of side-
line activities in the rural areas and laid the founda-
tion for rural enterprises, or TVEs.  TVEs were con-
ceived as a means of absorbing surplus labor associ-
ated with rising agricultural productivity.  Their dy-
namic growth was a largely unanticipated phenom-
enon.  Some of the reasons TVEs have been so big are
the ready availability of labor, the limited capital re-
quirements, and increased freedom from government
controls.  Critics are amazed by the growth of TVEs
since they are still collectively owned.  By 1992 TVEs
were estimated to have contributed more than 25% of
the countrys total exports. (de Menil, 279)  TVEs are
a successful alternative to rural unemployment.
C. Industrial Reform
After the governments success with agricul-
tural reforms, the government began to focus more on
the industrial sector and ownership issues.  In the pe-
riod after 1978 there was rapid growth in industrial
output due to reforms.  During this time the govern-
ment began experimenting with income taxation to
replace a direct profit transfer to the budget.  The gov-
ernment also began to expand the use of the
shareholding system.  The aim of this measure was to
separate the roles of the state.  No longer would the
state function as both the owner and the management
of the enterprises, they would only be the manager.
(Tseng, 50)  These reforms helped increase produc-
tivity in the industrial sector.  The average annual
growth rate of gross industrial output reached 15%.
(Lo, 1)  However, closer analysis reveals that the most
significant impact of industrial growth came from
nonstate-owned enterprises (including TVEs), indi-
vidual enterprises, and foreign funded enterprises.
The reason that state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) did not show as much growth is that they are
more than just places of employment.  SOEs perform
welfare functions, such as housing, medical care, and
education to their employees.  As a result, they con-
tinue to remain unprofitable, but unable to fail.
III. PRESENT REFORM
Today the industrial sector is again going un-
der reform.  On Sept. 12, 1997, President Jiang gave
a groundbreaking speech to the 15th Party Congress.
In this speech he announced that the state sector is in
for a wrenching downsizing (Clifford, 118).  Jiang
wants to change most of Chinas 305,000 state com-
panies into shareholder-owned corporations and be-
gin opening them to foreign competition.  While this
will mean a lot of unemployment and bankruptcies
for the iron rice bowls in the short run, in the long
run the country will benefit from it.  The state-owned
industrial sector remains characterized by overstaffed
and inefficient enterprises producing goods of sub-stan-
dard quality. (Bell, 86)  Many critics fear that this
new plan will lead to mass unemployment and unrest;
but the fact remains that the government cannot af-
ford to sustain these SOEs.  The state sector is unable
to compete with the more dynamic non-state indus-
trial sector, so reform must begin.
There is a group that is immediately benefit-
ing from Jiangs announcements for reforms.  This
group is the entrepreneurs.  Since President Jiang
Zemins announcement in which he affirmed that all
businesses would be treated equally as long as they
met basic requirements- such as paying taxes and sup-
porting the government- entrepreneurs have been ex-
panding their businesses.  The country has seen its
first private companies list on the stock market and
measures taken to limit government fees.  In the past
the private sector was secondary to the state sector,
but now its on an equal footing, says Ding Ningning,
director of a think tank at the governments Develop-
ment Research center.  That marks the first time since
the Communist Party-led state sector was founded in
1949 that private entrepreneurs officially have equal
status. (Johnson, A18)
IV. EFFECTS OF REFORM
Chinas reforms have raised 200 million
Chinese out of poverty since 1978.  However, China
still has a long way to go.  There are still 300 million
people in China that live on less than a dollar a day.
(Clifford, 119)  The largest reduction in poverty took
place during the first half of the 1980s.  Since then
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there has been little progress on this front, despite
strong growth in rural output.  This is because the once-
and for-all-benefits of agriculture reform have been
reaped, and TVEs, which are the main source of
continued growth in rural areas, have not developed
in remote areas in which poverty is largely confined.
Since there is still growth in China and little has been
done to decrease poverty recently, then income
disparity is increasing.
Chinas rise in inequality has largely been
driven by differences in growth between regions and
between urban and rural areas.  For example, the
southeastern coastal area has been growing at an
annual rate of over 13%,
compared with the national
average of 8.5%.  The growth
in central China, on the other
hand, has been around 6.5%.
This uneven growth has
created resentment and some
dissent in the country.  In 1993
there were farmers riots due to
the income gap.  A farmers
annual net income is only 770
yuan, about $135.  This is
about 40% of an urban
residents income. (MacDonald, 116)  This situation
has bred resentment and frustration about the
governments policies.  So although the country is
growing, it is not growing at the same pace; the rich
(entrepreneurs) are getting richer, and the poor
(farmers) remain poor.   Income disparity is a result of
the development of Special Economic Zones, which
increased the integration of China into the worlds
economy.
V. HISTORY OF TRADE
Beginning in the early reform era, one of
Chinas major goals of policy reform was its
integration into the worlds economy.  Every year since
this reform began, Chinas trade turnover has increased
considerably, with the exception of 1982.  Exports and
imports both expanded at an annual average rate of
over 16 percent.  Economic reforms within China also
caused important changes in the direction and
commodity consumption of trade, especially with
Chinas exports.  China began opening its doors with
the SEZ experiments, known as Special Export
Zones.  Later in the reform movement, the main
function of the SEZs was officially altered from
Special Export Zones to Experimental field of
reform policies.  These SEZs were one of Chinas
major policies used in their feeling the stones across
the river approach.  Furthermore, these policies for
integrating the Chinese economy into the world
economy had a large role in dismantling the central
planning system.  The central planning system had
always tried to follow set procedures to keep its control
over the economy.  Beginning in 1984, many Chinese
industries (specifically those
involved in foreign trade)





Many firms criticized the
excessive control and red tape
of the planning system, and
blamed it for missed
opportunities in the world
market.  Eventually, many of
the planning offices and planning procedures were
phased out as a result of all the criticism and
complaints.  As China realized the threats of being
left out of international markets it began to adjust its
economic system to more effectively handle world
competition.  By the end of 1988 most of Chinas
provinces had adopted the SEZs and a more relaxed
central planning system in some form or another.
Chinas trade liberalization was very beneficial for the
whole country.  It brought in foreign trade and
investment, helped to create jobs, reduced the need
for foreign loans, and created a class of people who
could see the positive changes as a result of a more
open economy.
In the mid 1970s, Deng Xiaoping began
developing a strategy to open up Chinas economy with
the exports of coal, petroleum, and petroleum products.
Between 1977 and 1985, exports of petroleum
products and crude oil more than tripled.  China went
from exporting only 11 million metric tons to more
than 36 million metric tons during this time.  In the
1980s, Chinas exports of manufactured goods also
Chinas rise in inequal-
ity has largely been
driven by differences in
growth between regions
and between urban and
rural areas.
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rose significantly.  However, the share of these goods
as a part of Chinas total exports changed little because
of the increased exports of petroleum products and an
increase in agriculture exports due to the large increase
in farm production during the late 1970s and early
1980s.  In time, the increasing exports of petroleum
were discovered to be much less beneficial than
originally believed.  China soon found that its
economic growth was being restricted by domestic
energy deficiencies.  At that point China began to shift
away from reliance on petroleum exports, toward
products it had a comparative advantage in.  This
comparative advantage was in labor intensive
manufactures such as apparel, footwear, textiles, toys
and sporting goods.  The share of Chinas total exports
that were accounted for by these types of labor
intensive products grew from 29.6 percent in 1985 to
40.2 percent by 1990.  This coincided with the
decrease in exports of crude oil and refined petroleum
that reached their peak in 1985.
Chinas composition of imports also changed
during the first decade of reform.  The share of primary
commodities in Chinas total imports fell from a little
over a third in 1980 to about a seventh in 1993.  This
was largely due to imports of agricultural products
only increasing slightly while total imports
quadrupled.  The percentage decrease in food and
agricultural imports was a result of the dramatic
growth in Chinas agriculture output.  The increase in
imports came largely from industrial products, which
rose from 65 percent in 1980 to 86 percent by 1993.
During that time, China began a massive importation
of machinery and transportation equipment that
possessed higher levels of technology than they were
capable of producing.
China was one of the first socialist countries
to shift its trade away from centrally planned trade
with other socialist countries, toward countries with
market economies.  Throughout the 1950s China was
connected very closely in its trade with the Soviet
Union, and to a lesser extent with Eastern Europe.
More than 3/4 of Chinas imports were from these
socialist countries and 2/3 of Chinas exports were
shipped to these countries during this time period.
Chinas split with the Soviet Union in 1960, was the
beginning of its shift away from trade with the socialist
countries.  Hong Kong seemed to be Chinas foot in
the door to the market economies that it shifted to.  In
fact, as one of these market economies, the United
States acquired a growing role in the final destination
for Chinese exports.  The U.S. share of exports from
China rose from a few percent of total exports in 1978
to 30 percent by 1992.  In monetary terms, U.S.
imports rose from about $30 million to almost $26
billion in this time period.  The increase was a result
of several factors, including: the shear size of the U.S.
economy, its relative openness to imports, Chinas
labor intensive goods being in high demand in the U.S.
and Chinas most favored  nation status.
VI. TRADING WITH THE UNITED STATES
A. Trade Deficit
In the early 1990s, many critics of Chinas
trade policies believed that China was engaged in a
mercantilist strategy.  They charged that China was
employing various plans to promote exports while
limiting access to its own domestic market.  This view
was particularly prevalent in the U.S. where trade
deficits continue to grow rapidly.  By 1991, the U.S.
trade deficit with China was 12.7 billion dollars,
second only to Japan.  This deficit has stimulated
demands in the U.S. that China improve its intellectual
property protection and liberalize access to its domestic
market.  Every year since 1983 the U.S. has incurred
a growing trade deficit with China, and by 1995 the
deficit was more than 36.7 billion dollars.
B. Intellectual Property
Under the original U.S. - China bilateral trade
agreement of 1979, China agreed to provide copyright,
patent, and trademark protection to foreign goods
imported into China.   However, Chinas compliance
with the agreement was not actually instituted until
the mid 1980s when the U.S. began to press the issue.
Even then there were still serious shortcomings.  After
six more rounds of negotiations, China agreed to
implement many laws that would increase intellectual
property protection, starting on January 1, 1993.  The
major areas affected were pharmaceutical, chemical,
software, and music.  Although China set up a legal
structure to adhere to international standards,
enforcement of the laws still remains partial in some
cases.  China has installed a specialized intellectual
property rights court in Beijing, but China continues
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to be a major producer of pirated CDs and computer
software.  The United States is still dealing with the
issue at this time.
C. Trade Barriers
Market access is the other major problem that
the U.S. faces in its trade with China.  The United
States and China began bilateral discussions in the mid
1980s to improve access to Chinas domestic market.
However, the imbalance continued to widen, and the
U.S. initiated more formal discussions in 1991.  The
U.S. objective was to persuade China to reduce the
number and severity of
administrative barriers
they imposed on U.S.
imports.  Initially the
trade talks in 1991 were
unproductive.  Only after
the U.S. government
composed a list of 3.9
billion dollars worth of
Chinese imports that
would be subject to
prohibitive tariffs, did
China reach an
agreement with the U.S..
On October 10th 1992
the far-reaching
agreement was signed.  The Chinese had agreed to
reduce 90 percent of all its import restrictions over 5
years time.  Although it has required continued and
difficult bilateral negotiations, China has by and large
lived up to its part of the agreement.
D. Most Favored Nation Status
Chinas most favored nation (MFN) status is
still a hotly debated subject.  MFN status can only be
granted to a non-market country, if the President of
the United States issues a waiver certifying either that
the country does not restrict emigration, or that
providing MFN status will probably result in increased
emigration.  Once MFN status is awarded to a non-
market economy, it must be renewed annually by the
President.  In Chinas case, this occurs on July 3rd
each year.  However, this can also be over-ridden by
the U.S. Congress.  China was first granted this status
in 1980.  Since then the U.S. has used the renewal
option as leverage to improve Chinas human rights,
limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and to increase
the openness of Chinas market to U.S. goods.  If we
should choose not to renew Chinas MFN status, there
are numerous estimates as to its affect on Chinas trade
with the U.S.  Obviously there would be a retaliatory
decrease in exports to China from the U.S..  In addition,
1993 estimates by Hong Kongs government conclude
that a loss of MFN status would reduce exports to the
U.S. by 34 to 47 percent.  Another obvious result
would be increased prices for U.S. consumers, either
from a lack of competition or from tariff costs passed-
on to consumers.  U.S. tariff rates for countries without
MFN status are 5 to 10
times higher.  Toys, for
example, jump from a
7.4 % tariff to a 55 %
tariff when MFN status is
revoked.  As a
requirement of 1993s
renewal of Chinas MFN
status, the U.S. made a
list of areas that China
needed to improve on.
These improvements
were, the respect of
fundamental human
rights as recognized in
the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, allowing freedom to
emigrate and travel abroad, providing an accounting
of and releasing those imprisoned for the peaceful
expression of their political views, ending forced
abortions and sterilizations as family planning policies,
ceasing religious persecution, ensuring that prisoners
are not mistreated and have access to medical care,
protecting Tibets religious and cultural heritage, and
ending the jamming of The Voice of America
Broadcasts. (Lardy, 126)  There are many positives
and negatives of continuing to extend most favored
nation status to China.  Only time will tell the ultimate
decision of Chinas most favored nation status.
VII. CHINAS FUTURE
What is Chinas future?  Many believe that it
will be the next super power.  This leaves some Ameri-
cans with a queasy feeling.  Most Americans see
With the world-wide collapse
of Communism, Chinas lead-
ers know that they must con-
tinue economic growth to stay
in power. That means integra-
tion with the world economy,
even though it will shrink the
role of the state.
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China as a one-party totalitarian state that
delegitimized itself by turning its tanks on its own
people at Tiananmen Square and is now using cheap
labor to threaten American jobs. (Zuckerman, 84)
However, Americans must avoid stereotyping China
by memories of its past.  Today, China is changing.
With the world-wide collapse of Communism, Chinas
leaders know that they must continue economic growth
to remain in power.  That means integration with the
world economy, even though it will  shrink the role of
the state.  China is slowly progressing away from
Communism.  Unquestionably China is much freer
today than it was two decades ago when reforms be-
gan.  All social controls have been dramatically re-
duced, enabling people to pursue their lives, their live-
lihoods, and their interests largely unimpeded by state
interference. (Zuckerman, 84)  I expect that in the
future, Chinas political system will begin to change.
A clue to Chinas future can be seen in Hong
Kong.  Hong Kong, with its world contacts, entrepre-
neurial skills, and trade links for Chinas economic
development, is Chinas gateway to the rest of the
Western world.  It has been over 100 days since the
changeover and little has changed.  None of the short-
term disaster scenarios for Hong Kong under Chinese
rule have come true- no outspoken politicians thrown
in jail, no newspaper offices boarded up, no confisca-
tion, and no suppression.  China has been so careful to
avoid even the appearance of interference that it has
resorted to symbolism to reinforce the point.  Prince
of Wales is still seen on the British militarys former
headquarters, now the base of the Peoples Liberation
Army.  There is a total lack of interference in our
affairs, says Raymond Chien, a trading company
executive and advisor to Tung Chee Hwa, the Special
Administrative Regions chief executive.   I thought
surely there would be some attempt at influence.
(Kahn, A18) Even though China has not interfered in
Hong Kong, Hong Kong has avoided any real test by
sticking closely to Beijings thinking on sensitive is-
sues.  Hong Kong hopes to lead China into the next
century by acting as a model of how China should be.
China knows not to interfere in Hong Kong because
the whole world is watching Chinas movements and
not only would there be a negative impact in Hong
Kong, but Chinas foreign trade and international re-
lations would also suffer.
When Deng Xioaping died, many people won-
dered if China would continue reform.  Jiang Zemin
has indicated that reform will indeed continue.  In his
recent visit to the United States he indicated that he
understands that the key to economic reform is join-
ing the global economy, and to do so he must stabilize
Chinas international relations.  So Jiang is a favor-
able leader to the West.  Believers of human rights
must give China time to reform.  A China devoted to
economic enterprise will be freer and more peaceful.
(Zuckerman, 83)  And as China becomes more de-
pendent on the international economy it will become
more likely to play by the worlds rules.  China should
not be looked at as a threat to the world, but instead as
a new market with endless possibilities.
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